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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
**INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (U)**



(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424; Sec. 3.3(b) (8)

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## DIA INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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### VIETNAM AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

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
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**NORTH VIETNAM**

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**SOUTH VIETNAM**

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Lao Generals' Attitude Toward North Vietnam Stiffens

High-ranking Lao Army (FAR) officers believe the government should abandon its neutralist posture if the nations that signed the Geneva Accords do nothing to remove North Vietnamese troops from Laos. They have, however, apparently done little to put this view across to Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma.

The commanders of Military Regions (MRs) 4 and 2 -- Gens Phasouk and Vang Pao -- told a gathering of general officers on 14 March that the country's neutralist stance would have to be changed in view of the increased threat posed by North Vietnamese troops. Phasouk proposed that Vientiane press the Geneva signatories to force Hanoi to remove its troops. If this failed, the government should then take a firm stand against North Vietnam. If it didn't, Phasouk suggested that the FAR generals sponsor a vote of censure in the Assembly.

The generals were supposedly resolved to support Phasouk, but when they met with Souvanna, their determination had disappeared and they did not even mention his proposals.

Gen Vang Pao did, however, get Souvanna to permit air strikes against several towns in MR 2, including Sam Neua. The Prime Minister exempted two specific buildings as targets -- those housing Communist China's cultural and economic mission in Phong Savan and its military representatives in Khang Khay

Sec. 3.3(b) (1)

Despite their timidity when confronting Souvanna, the generals -- especially Phasouk and Vang Pao, two of the country's most able -- are upset at the progress of the war. That the FAR can prosecute it more vigorously, with or without Souvanna's consent, is doubtful. The army has had difficulty holding some of its defensive positions. Unless its capabilities are greatly increased, the generals will probably support, however reluctantly, the present government. (~~SECRET~~  
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~)





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Cambodians Concerned Over Internal Security

The army is apparently making steady progress against "Red" Cambodian insurgents, even though it reportedly lacks reserves and good intelligence on dissident activities.


An officer said recently that a number of battalions had been alerted but that there were not enough troops to provide adequate internal security countrywide. He added that some young officers and officials were demanding more prompt and decisive action by the government. After the Reds launched a series of attacks in Military Region 2 in late February, the army appealed to Prince Sihanouk for money to increase its strength by 5,000. The Prince said he could not even provide proper clothing for those already in service.

Nevertheless, the army may now have the situation in MR 2 largely under control. A message claimed that "788 Reds" had rallied there between 12 and 17 March. Incidents continue to be reported, however, in Battambang Province. Some 14,000 "people" -- probably an exaggeration -- are said to be participating in the second phase of a sweep there supported by tactical air units and artillery, and additional weapons and ammunition have been provided.

Small isolated skirmishes are occurring in the west, and casualties since 27 February favor the government. Red losses were 55 killed, 12 wounded, 144 captured, and 1,425 ralliers -- including the 788 in MR 2. Government forces lost about 21 killed and 14 wounded. (~~SECRET~~ Sec. 3.3 NO FOREIGN DISSEM/  
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


## NOTES

COMMUNIST CHINA: The combat jet aircraft order of battle in the south is shown opposite. The 36 to 60 jet fighters that flew from Hainan Island to Leipei (Suihsi) on 2 March may still be there; if they are, total aircraft strength in the south remains at about 580. Of more significance is the fact that Leipei is an air force base and naval air elements are not normally colocated with air force units. The navy fighters may still fly north, as originally expected, but if they remain at Leipei, the air force's 26th Division will probably move elsewhere in South China. ~~(TOP SECRET~~ (b)(3) 10  
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
COMMUNIST CHINA: The deactivated Shantou Air Defense Subsector of the Kuangchou Air Defense District, which was in existence from April 1967 to February 1968, was apparently created to provide operational training for personnel assigned to inland radar stations within the district. Its three additional radars contributed little to the early warning capability of the area but offered excellent opportunities to track "hostile" aircraft from Taiwan; few such "hostiles" are encountered at the inland stations. (See map overleaf.) ~~(TOP SECRET~~ (b)(3) 10  
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**VIETNAM  
AND  
RELATED DEVELOPMENTS**





Developments in South Vietnam

~~(S)~~ S Renewed Communist offensive activity may be coming soon. In 1st Corps, elements of the 2d NVA Division are apparently withdrawing from the southern coastal area into the mountains on the Quang Nam-Quang Tin border. In 2d Corps, recent messages indicate that a subordinate of the 24th NVA Regiment has moved closer to Pleiku City and the 174th NVA Regimental headquarters and the 1st NVA Division Forward Tactical Group are between Kontum and Pleiku City. In Khanh Hoa Province, two South Korean Battalions have made several contacts with enemy forces. An agent claims that the third and last phase of a general offensive in 4th Corps will occur during the period of 20-30 March.

Enemy Contacts in 1st Corps

~~(S)~~ Activity centered around the city of Hue. Several engagements were reported yesterday ranging from approximately 10 miles northwest of the city to 12 miles southwest. The combined actions left 110 of the enemy dead. Allied losses were 12 killed and 67 wounded.

Communist Forces May Renew Offensive Activity

~~(S)~~ Se According to COMUSMACV, statements made by a prisoner captured during the Tet offensive indicate that the exact timing of the coordinated attacks was passed to some units by means of a certain radio signal. This signal has now been repeated, and, if the code remains unchanged, it appears that an attack is scheduled for the Khe Sanh area. The suggested time for this strike was 0300H on 23 March. Action in the 3d Corps was suggested for either 0300H or 0600H on the same day (1400 or 1700 EST).

~~(S)~~ Se Sec. 3.3(b) (1)  
North Vietnamese AN-2 aircraft are apparently preparing for flight operations within the next few days near the DMZ, possibly in the Khe Sanh area.

(Continued)



Sec. 3.3(b) (1)

the operations will be carried out by two or three AN-2s equipped with bombing apparatus and rocket pods. These aircraft may do no more than drop supplies but a bombing raid or rocket attack cannot be totally discounted.

Sec. 3.3(b) (1)

### Reduced Enemy Threat in Southern 1st Corps

~~(TS)~~ Sec. 3.3(b) (1) elements of the 2d NVA Division are pulling out of the heavily populated coastal region of northern Military Region 5 into the rugged Quang Nam-Quang Tin border area. They had operated along the coast during the Tet offensive and were on an alert status while near Hoi An. Elements of Group 44 remain in eastern Quang Nam and are still in a state of readiness.

### Situation Near Kontum and Pleiku

~~(S)~~ Se The enemy may be showing new interest in the Pleiku City area. Recent messages sent by the B-3 Front and the move of a subordinate of the 24th NVA Regiment closer to Pleiku City provide increasing evidence of enemy interest in the area. In addition, the Headquarters, 174th NVA Regiment and the 1st NVA Division Forward Tactical Group are now midway between Kontum and Pleiku. This would allow the division to control an offensive against either or both.

~~(S)~~ S On 21 March, Headquarters, 1st NVA Division was fixed 20 miles west of Kontum City or approximately

(Continued)



16 miles southeast of its 18 March location in Cambodia. This relocation is reminiscent of activity which preceded the battles for Dak To last November and could indicate that offensive actions against Kontum City are pending.

#### Attacks on Allied Airfields


(C) In Phong Dinh Province, Binh Thuy Air Base received 35 rounds of 75-mm recoilless rifle today. Also, Bien Hoa Air Base in Bien Hoa Province received six rounds of 122-mm rocket fire. Five helicopters were damaged at Bien Hoa, and electrical power was temporarily severed at Binh Thuy Air Base. No ground penetration was attempted in either case. Friendly casualties were light.

#### Threat to Nha Trang Possibly Reduced

(C) In coastal Khanh Hoa Province, two South Korean battalions made several contacts about nine miles southwest of Nha Trang on 20 March. The enemy lost 27 soldiers killed, 130 82-mm mortar rounds, and over a ton of staples. This could further aggravate previously reported supply shortages and help reduce the threat to Allied facilities in and around Nha Trang.

#### VC Phased Attacks in 4th Corps

(C) Sec. 3.3(b) (1) the general offensive under way in 4th Corps involves three periods of activity, two of which have been completed (31 January-23 February and 29 February-15 March). The third was to begin on 20 March and continue until the 30th. A US adviser says that the level of Viet Cong-initiated incidents tend to support this timing. (~~TOP SECRET~~ Sec. 3.3/)





North Vietnamese Air Defense Developments

Five US aircraft were lost to North Vietnamese air defenses during the period 6-19 March. All were apparently downed by ground fire; there were no losses to SAMs or MIGs. Two US aircraft were lost to unknown causes. Weather restricted US air operations.

SAM Activity

The number of SAMs fired decreased to 66 from 74 for the previous two weeks. There were indications of activity at 47 sites, 16 of which probably launched the missiles expended. SAM-associated radars were active in the DMZ area, but only one missile was reportedly launched there.

MIG Activity

MIG activity dropped off considerably -- some 150 sorties as compared with 220. North Korean pilots continued to fly almost two-thirds of all defense patrols, while the North Vietnamese pilots flew primarily training missions. MIG-17s were involved in most of the combat and defensive patrol sorties. There were no aerial engagements; the last took place on 23 February, when one US aircraft was downed.

The level of fighter activity is similar to that of a year ago, and this part of the defensive system is not believed to have changed significantly. Activity is probably low because of weather, the small number of aircraft present, and fewer US sorties over the northern part of the country; off-field dispersal may also be a factor.


Overall, the system did not change drastically, but air surveillance and EW/GCI capabilities were improved in the southern Panhandle. The positioning of a BAR LOCK radar and a probable height-finder about 15 nautical miles southwest of Vinh will provide better control of MIGs operating as far south as the DMZ. ~~(SECRET)~~

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# NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR SITUATION AS OF 21 MAR 68

8 IL-28/BEAGLE	4 YUNNANI, 2 PHUC YEN	37 IL-14/LI-2/ CRATE/CAB	HANOI/HAIPHONG/YUNNANI, LANG SON
LIGHT JET BOMBER	2 NANNING	TRANSPORT	AREA AIRFIELDS
22 MIG-21/FISHBED	14 YUNNANI, 8 PHUC YEN	17 MI-1/4/HARE/HOUND	VARIOUS AIRFIELDS AND DISPERSAL AREAS
JET FIGHTER		HELICOPTER	PRIMARILY HANOI/HAIPHONG
86 MIG-15/17/FAGOT/FRESCO	67 YUNNANI, 5 GIA LAM, 4 KEP,	4 MI-6/HOOK	VARIOUS AIRFIELDS AND
JET FIGHTER	10 NANNING	HELICOPTER	DISPERSAL AREAS PRIMARILY HANOI
		29 PROP TRAINER	HANOI/HAIPHONG/ LANG SON
			AREA AIRFIELDS
3 UMIG-15/MIDGET	YUNNANI	3 AN-24/COKE	YUNNANI
JET TRAINER		TRANSPORT	
22 AN-2/COLT	HAIPHONG/LANG SON/HANOI/	1 IL-18/COOT	CHINA (LAST NOTED NANNING)
LIGHT TRANSPORT	YUNNANI AREA AIRFIELDS	TRANSPORT	



LOCATION			
NVN	JET	AIRCRAFT	
FIGHTERS			
MIG-15/17	86	9	77
MIG-21	22	8	14
FTRS SUB-			
TOTAL	108	17	91
BOMBERS			
IL-28	8	2	6
TRAINERS			
UMIG-15	3	0	3
TOTAL JET			
AIRCRAFT	119	19	100

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## LATEST PHOTOGRAPHY SELECTED AIRFIELDS

PHUC YEN	14 FEB 68	VINH	14 FEB 68
KEP	14 FEB 68	NA SAN	28 FEB 68
GIA LAM	17 MAR 68	DONG HOI	20 MAR 68
KIEN AN	12 MAR 68	BAI THUONG	14 FEB 68
CAT BI	16 MAR 68	YEN BAI	18 JAN 68
HOA LAC	14 FEB 68	PEITUN/	
		YUNNANI, CHINA	9 MAR 68

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North Vietnamese Air Situation and Status of Airfields

The estimated North Vietnamese air situation and status of selected airfields are shown opposite.

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(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 the aircraft were probably MIG-21s. No MIG-21s have been carried at Nanning nor have any been noted arriving there recently; however, they probably transferred undetected from Peitun/Yunnani. In addition, photographs of Yunnani on 9 March revealed four probable IL-28s, which may mean that one transferred there undetected from Nanning.

~~(SECRET)~~ Sec. 3.3(b) (1)

Hanoi's Top Western Envoy Now in Switzerland

North Vietnamese Delegate General in Paris Mai Van Bo arrived in Switzerland on 19 March for about a one-week stay. According to the Swiss Government, his visit is in return for one made to Hanoi by the Swiss Ambassador in Peiping.

Bo has already had several talks with Swiss Foreign Ministry officials, including representatives of the Ministry's Department of International Organizations, and Swiss Red Cross officials.

The decision to send Bo suggests that Hanoi is discussing with the Swiss wide aspects of the war. His visit could also be a preliminary to the establishment of diplomatic relations.

~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~



Prominent American Newsmen To Visit Hanoi

The North Vietnamese may allow CBS newsman Walter Cronkite to visit Hanoi.


Cronkite has been trying to go to North Vietnam since mid-1967; Australian Communist journalist Wilfred Burchett had relayed Hanoi's conditional approval in January but noted that it would be necessary "to wait for a favorable moment."

A French member of the International War Crimes Tribunal in Hanoi asked the CBS London Office on 18 March if Cronkite could be in Phnom Penh on Thursday (presumably 21 March) to depart for Hanoi the next day.

Hanoi probably approved the visit finally as part of its worldwide efforts to explain its "reasonable" position on negotiations. It may also feel that the time is now propitious for a concerted propaganda effort against the American people. Cronkite's visit would be the first by a prominent US newsman since Harrison Salisbury was there early last year. (~~TOP SECRET~~ Sec. 3.)



# CHINESE COMMUNIST AAA — KUANGCHOU ADD/NVN



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Rotation of Chinese Communist AAA Units in North Vietnam

The expected rotation of a Chinese Communist Army (CCA) AAA unit to Thai Nguyen, North Vietnam, has probably taken place. On 19 March, an unidentified Peiping Military Region CCA AAA unit replaced the incumbent army unit, possibly a division, in operational communications between the Canton Military Region and North Vietnam.

The Peiping Military Region AAA unit has not been noted before and is probably a new composite unit. The outgoing unit relieved the possible CCA 61st AAA Division at Thai Nguyen last August. The probable replacement of the Chinese Communist Air Force (CCAF) 110th AAA Division in the Hanoi area by the CCAF 104th AAA Division began in early March and is expected to be completed by the end of the month.

Other major Chinese AAA units now in North Vietnam are the probable CCA 66th AAA Division in the Yen Bai area and the CCAF 111th AAA Division at Lang Son. (~~SECRET~~ Sec. 3.3(b))

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Mauritius Recognizes USSR and Communist China

The Government of Mauritius has granted diplomatic recognition to the USSR and Communist China. It plans to establish relations with Peiping, but no date has been set for an official exchange of representatives. Chinese officials have reportedly promised "to do everything possible to assist" and are sending 10,000 tons of rice to Mauritius; a commercial mission is expected soon.

Both Moscow and Peiping have provided assistance to youth and labor groups, and formal relations are unlikely to result in any immediate, significant increase in Communist support or presence. The Government's decision was dictated by the economic and ethnic problems affecting the multiracial island. Prime Minister Ramgoolam fears increased Communist influence but considers it necessary to accept aid from any willing donor to bolster the extremely vulnerable economy. This decision will also please the 24,000-member Chinese community. (SECRET (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 42)

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